Research and Policy Implications by Kriesberg, Louis
Sociological Practice
Volume 10
Issue 1 Conflict Processing Article 12
January 1992
Research and Policy Implications
Louis Kriesberg
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/socprac
Part of the Sociology Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Open Access Journals at DigitalCommons@WayneState. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Sociological Practice by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@WayneState.
Recommended Citation
Kriesberg, Louis (1992) "Research and Policy Implications," Sociological Practice: Vol. 10: Iss. 1, Article 12.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/socprac/vol10/iss1/12
Research and Policy Implications*
Louis Kriesberg
ABSTRACT
This article focuses on intractable conflicts and how they are transformed.
Specific attention is given to the kinds of questions raised by research on such
conflicts as well as the policy implications of selected research efforts.
Although we believe that in most cases reducing the intractability of
conflicts is desirable, we also recognize that often one (or more) adversary
believes that any likely settlement of its conflict would be worse than
maintaining the struggle.
Whether or not an intractable conflict is preferable to any particular set-
tlement depends upon one's values and interests. Whether the reader
believes that inhibiting the intractability of a particular conflict or class of
conflicts is desirable or that fostering intractability is preferable, policy
suggestions can be stated as if either were true. The reader can invert the
policy suggestion in accord with her or his preference.
The policy implications suggested pertain to a phase in conflict settle-
ment that is beginning to receive needed attention: prenegotiation. In the
past, most attention among analysts of conflict resolution was focused on
* Printed with permission of Syracuse University Press. This article was the last chapter in
Intractable Conflicts and Their Transformation (1989), pp. 210-220, edited by L. Kriesberg,
T. A. Northrup, and S. J. Thorson.
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negotiation and mediation in negotiations. Recently, attention has turned to
how adversaries come to the table to conduct negotiations. To maximize
the utility of research and policy suggestions, it is necessary to specify the
kinds of conflicts for which the suggestions are relevant.
Specifying Kinds of Conflicts
Throughout the discussion in this chapter, we consider what is shared by
all social conflicts and what is specific to particular kinds of conflicts. This
assumes that they form an equivalence class but requires categorizing kinds
of conflicts.
One conventional categorization of conflicts is in terms of "levels," the
size of the arena and adversaries. Thus, we commonly speak of interper-
sonal conflicts (e.g., within families), intergroup or interorganizational con-
flict (e.g., within a community or country), and international conflict (e.g.,
within world regions). Another conventional categorization is in terms of
specific issues in contention, for example, environmental policy, child cus-
tody, ethnic separatism, control over territory, or control of a state.
For purposes of research and theory building, other systems of catego-
rization are more relevant and useful than the conventional systems. No sin-
gle dimension of conflict can provide an adequate set of categories. Social
conflicts are multidimensional and so must be the categorizations. We must
take into account the characteristics of the adversaries, the social system
within which they are contending, and the issues about which they are strug-
gling. This is not the place to present the elaborate and detailed categoriza-
tion of conflicts; it is sufficient to outline relevant major dimensions.
Adversaries vary in number (Raiffa 1982). They also vary in the degree
to which they are clearly bounded and internally differentiated (Kriesberg
1982). Clearly bounded adversary units are ones with generally recognized
and publicly defined members and in which the membership in a particu-
lar adversary unit does not substantially overlap with membership in oth-
ers that are likely to be in conflict with it. For example, persons, states, and
organizations are clearly bounded compared to social classes, ethnic
groups, and supporters of different environmental policies. Units are highly
differentiated insofar as there are many specialized roles, most importantly
ones involving the conduct of conflict relations with other units. For exam-
ple, states are highly differentiated, with special bureaucracies for external
relations, including war making.
Social conflicts involving one or more adversaries who are not clearly
bounded or highly differentiated are likely to follow different patterns of
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intractability transformation than are conflicts among clearly bounded and
highly differentiated adversaries. Thus, when heads of the adversary units
have the authority to make binding decisions, shifts toward tractability can
be relatively quickly done. For example, the Israeli and Egyptian govern-
ments moved toward tractability more decisively than have the Israeli Jews
and Arab Palestinians.
The social systems within which adversaries contend vary in the degree
to which they have institutionalized rules for managing conflicts and in the
content of those rules (Wehr 1979). Conflicts are waged usually within the
context of a social system with rules for their conducts and they often take
on qualities of a game. Every society and most organizations have both for-
mal and informal rules for managing conflicts. Rules, however, are not well
developed for conflicts among states; even within a society, they do not
effectively regulate conflicts among nonlegitimate adversaries, and about
issues not considered legitimate.
The social systems also vary in the way the adversary units relate to
each other in that system. Thus, the parties may have a great deal of mutual
dependence, relatively independent of each other, or be in a relationship of
domination and subordination.
Adversary units are related to each other in a variety of ways within dif-
ferent social systems. They vary in the power they have relative to each
other, in the degree of dependency each has on the other, and in their rela-
tionship to the interpreters and implementors of the institutionalized means
of managing conflicts. For example, an ethnic conflict might be between
two ethnic groups which are both marginal in the host society or between
one ethnic group that is marginal and another that occupies the dominant
political and economic strata.
Conflicts vary significantly in the number and content of the issues that
are matters of contention (Raiffa 1982). The nominal content of the
issues—environmental damage in Alaska, the political borders of Germany,
or the custody of Mary D. and John D.'s children—is infinite: every con-
flict is unique. We need to have more abstract ways of categorizing con-
flicts to make useful generalizations possible.
One general distinction that has been made for several years is between
conflicts that are consensual and those that are dissensual (Aubert 1963). In
consensual conflicts, the adversaries agree about what is valued and differ
about the allocation of what they agree they want; this may be land or
another resource. The parties are fighting about interests. In dissensual con-
flicts, the parties differ about what is desirable, but at least one party insists
that the other adopt its vision of what is desirable; this may refer to politi-
cal ideology or religious faith. The fighting is about values they do not share.
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Another relevant distinction is between conflicts in which the adver-
saries do or do not share a common understanding of the nature of the fight
between them. In some conflicts, the antagonists do not agree about the
issues in contention; perhaps one side stresses one consensual and the other
the dissensual nature of their struggle with each other.
Finally, a difficult conceptual matter pertaining to the issues in con-
tention must be considered. Partisans and observers sometimes assert that
a particular conflict is "unrealistic" (Coser 1956). This usually means that
one or more of the adversaries is said to be mistaken about the source of
its grievance. For example, ethnic conflicts in the United States are some-
times said to be unrealistic, as when prejudice is alleged to arise from the
psychological displacement of other feelings. A social conflict is realistic
when the analyst believes that there are objective or structural conditions
which are the bases for the social conflict and that these conditions corre-
spond to the ostensible matter of contention among the adversaries.
The distinction between realistic and unrealistic conflict has two other
conventional meanings that should be recognized. One is that a conflict is
unrealistic when the goals set by an adversary are unattainable. Unrealistic
conflict occasionally refers to a conflict in which the means being used are
out of proportion or unrelated to the ostensible purposes of the adversaries.
Every actual conflict is a blend of these features. Consensual and dis-
sensual matters are both present; not all members of all adversary groups
agree about what the issues in contention are; consequently, analysts are
likely to recognize some realistic and unrealistic elements in every fight.
The utility of these dimensions about the characteristics of the adver-
saries, about the social systems in which they contend, and about the issues
of contention is indicated as we discuss needed research and policy impli-
cations.
Needed Research
The kinds of research that the analysis and discussions suggest would be
important are discussed in the following three categories: (1) the meaning
of intractability, (2) the bases and deepening of intractability, and (3) the
reduction and transformation of intractability. And in discussing needed
research, we emphasize research questions and not research design. The
designs should often include comparisons among different kinds of con-
flicts in order to assess the generalizability of any findings.
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Meaning of Intractable Conflicts
Whether or not a conflict is regarded as intractable is a matter of social
judgment based on social conventions. There are social conventions about
how long different kinds of conflicts are expected to persist, about the
expectations adversaries have concerning the possibility of a settlement,
and about what the employable limits are to the means of struggle.
Research also needs to be conducted to discover who among the adver-
saries effectively defines a conflict as intractable.
Who defines a conflict as intractable is important insofar as that charac-
terization impacts on the conflict itself. Is it likely that once a conflict is
labeled intractable intermediary efforts are reduced because they are regarded
as doomed to fail? Is it likely that the adversaries themselves tend to believe
that the struggle will not be settled for a very long time and/or must await
major external intervention, once they accept the conflict as intractable?
We should also ask how answers to such questions vary among differ-
ent kinds of conflicts. For example, we expect that conflicts that occur in
social systems with institutionalized rules for managing conflicts will be
identified as intractable in terms of their relationship to such rules, as inter-
preted by the rulemakers. Thus, fights about matters similar to ones usu-
ally processed through the judicial system, if not settled within that system,
are likely to be viewed as intractable. This may be the case for environ-
mental disputes.
We also believe that dissensual conflicts are more readily characterized
as intractable because the expectation is that no major party will change its
basic values; but adversaries are viewed as more ready to settle disputes
over matters about which they share values. Thus, the value or cultural dif-
ferences in ethnic conflicts obstruct finding mutually acceptable solutions.
Bases of Intractability and Increasing Intractability
One basis for intractable conflicts is felt threats to one's individual or
collective identity. Research is needed about the ways in which multiple
identities are related to each other and how some identifications become
salient and the grounds for an intractable conflict while others do not. One
arena in which relevant research has been done pertains to ethnic identities
and loyalty to the state, but this research has usually focused on the emer-
gence of conflict and its persistence. The transformation of such conflicts
into tractability has been relatively neglected.
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Because one of the ways identity is formed is in opposition to other
groups of people, that process needs to be better understood. Once a strug-
gle is underway, adversaries often try to define the other and impose an iden-
tification. This is exemplified by struggles to define Palestinians, Zionists,
Israelis, and Arabs. Research is needed about the way efforts to define the
enemy occur and threaten each party's self-identification. Research is also
needed about how conflicts are waged so that they do not entail such efforts
by adversaries to impose an unwanted identification on each other.
Intractability can emerge from several other bases. Once conflicts are
underway, segments of each adversary group often develop a vested inter-
est in the struggle. For the fighters, it may become a way of life. Research
is needed about such developments and about what fosters and what
inhibits them.
A long-standing idea in the social science literature is that conflicts in
which many lines of cleavage are superimposed are likely to be intense
(Dahrendorf 1959). They are also likely to be intractable. Consequently,
when ethnic lines correspond to class, religious, linguistic, and regional
differences, crosscutting ties are likely to be absent, and a mutually satis-
factory resolution difficult to construct. On the other hand, when such divi-
sions overlap and crosscut each other, particular disputes are likely to seem
manageable. We need research to assess this idea, for different kinds of
conflicts in different contexts.
Conflicts in which the outcomes sought by each side threaten the adver-
saries' basic interests are also likely to be intractable. For example, Paige
(1975) has argued that agrarian revolutions vary in accord with the basic
sources of income of the cultivators and noncultivalors. He argues that
when the cultivators earn their income from the land (as workers on a com-
mercial hacienda) and so do the noncultivators (the owners of the com-
mercial hacienda), an intense social revolution is more likely than when the
cultivators earn their income in the form of wages (as on a plantation) and
the noncultivators' income is largely from their capital investment (as in a
plantation). In the latter case, reform is more likely than revolution, and the
conflict is relatively tractable.
All these matters are likely to vary among different kinds of conflicts.
Examining any one of them comparatively, among different kinds of con-
flicts, should illuminate our understanding of each. To take one illustration,
consider the growth of identifications in a way that threatens one or more
than one of the parties in a struggle. In arenas with well-established insti-
tutionalized processes for handling conflicts among recognized parties, the
parties may be clearly identified but not threaten each other's essential
identity. This may be the case, for example, in highly regulated collective
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bargaining between trade unions and management. In arenas with less well-
established institutionalized processes, the issues in contention may be less
well bounded and even the identities less clear. For example, in the emerg-
ing environmental disputes, the parties are often still in the process of
defining themselves and trying to characterize their protagonists.
We might also ask how the development of vested interests in a struggle
differs among conflicts in which the adversaries are large, clearly bounded,
and highly differentiated, as in a struggle between unions and management,
and among ones in which the adversaries are not very large, clearly
bounded, or differentiated, as in a child custody struggle between divorcing
parents. In conflicts between large-scale adversaries, each one tends to
develop specialists in conducting the struggle who make a career of it.
Transforming Intractable Conflicts
As discussed by Hunter (1989) and Frohock (1989), one basis for
intractable conflicts is the ontological differences in the adversaries' view of
issues. Their fundamental differences make a resolution of their conflict very
difficult. Even under these circumstances, however, the adversaries may set-
tle a particular dispute, without a change in their ontologies. As Hunter
points out, an ontology does not predict an exact position on a given issue.
Research is needed on how specific settlements are reached, without
changes in ontologies. Settlements may depend on accepting the results of
institutionalized procedures, as when religious and medical ontologies
seem incompatible to particular sects and hospitals, but the courts rule on
the settlement of a particular dispute. How does this happen in less-insti-
tutionalized arenas? What are the consequences of such settlements? Do
they weaken or reinforce the ontological differences or do such settlements
leave them untouched?
Adversaries never have purely conflicting relations; they always have
some common interests and even shared identifications. We need research
on how the balance between those cooperative or complementary aspects
and the competitive or conflictual aspects shift. Presumably when the rel-
ative importance of cooperative or complementary aspects increases, a con-
flict becomes more tractable.
One matter that affects the relative significance of cooperative and of
antagonistic aspects of the relationship is the salience of other conflicts
each adversary has. When do adversaries come to regard a common enemy
as a major concern? When does one adversary come to believe that enemy
number one has become a secondary enemy? What circumstances and/or
ideas contribute to reframing a conflict so that it becomes tractable?
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In the conflict resolution literature, the intervention of a mediator is
often presumed to be an important element not only in facilitating negoti-
ations but also in initiating de-escalating negotiations. We need research
about the extent to which that is the case. Under what circumstances does
an intermediary facilitate de-escalation in an intractable conflict?
An important debate about the transformation of an intractable conflict
is between those who argue that it is a gradual process and those who argue
that it entails a rapid, fundamental shift. On one hand, the argument is that
step-by-step, piece-by-piece settlements of particular disputes enable adver-
saries to begin to trust each other enough to think constructively about
mutually acceptable outcomes (Kriesberg 1986). The conflict is then man-
ageable and can be pursued as a tractable conflict. On the other hand, it is
argued that once a conflict has become intractable, mistrust is so high that
a dramatic and fundamental shift is needed. A basic change in the nature
of the conflict and the way it is conceived by the partisans is necessary.
When basic needs are being dealt with, movement toward resolution is pos-
sible (Burton 1987). We need to examine actual cases of conflicts becom-
ing tractable to assess these different views.
In all these matters, comparisons among different kinds of conflicts
would be useful. It is clear that within systems that have highly institu-
tionalized conflict regulation, the roles of intermediaries are diverse and
specialized. In addition to conciliators, mediators, and arbitrators, they
include judges, juries, commissions, agencies, and legislative bodies. Even
for conflicts that are not conducted within a regulated context, many kinds
of intermediaries can and do provide a wide variety of conflict manage-
ment functions. These are done informally and by persons and groups who
act without explicit designation or recognition as intermediaries by the
adversaries in the conflict.
Several examples of groups performing such informal intermediary
actions include U.S. dialogue groups on the Middle East, the Greens in
West Germany, and researchers on environmental issues in Alaska.
Research is needed about the ways formal and informal intermediary
activity supplement each other and undermine each other. Analyses of alter-
native dispute resolution in conjunction with the judicial system and of Track
II (unofficial) diplomacy in conjunction with official diplomacy are begin-
ning to be undertaken (Bendahmane 1987). Comparisons between them
would be useful. In addition, studies of the varying effectiveness of experts,
intellectuals, and religious leaders mediating in conflicts that differ in the
degree to which value and interest issues are in dispute would be useful.
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Policy Implications
As previously stated, policy is discussed as if transforming an intractable
conflict to a tractable one is the goal. This need not be the case for an actor
in a particular fight, since any reasonably foreseeable settlement might be
undesirable for that person or group. Such an actor might read these pol-
icy implications as providing ideas not to be implemented but turned
around.
It is important to be explicit about the role being played by the would-
be policy maker. The policy that might be pursued by a member of one of
the adversary entities is obviously different than the policies that might be
pursued by an intermediary. Policies are also likely to be different for a
major officeholder, and opposition leader, or a rank-and-file member of one
of the adversary parties.
Policies also should be explicitly placed in a time frame. This is espe-
cially significant when we consider intractable conflicts. After all, every
fight does end, but it does matter whether this termination follows years or
even generations of sacrifice. Discussions of policy should be explicit
about the length of time in which the policy is to be implemented: days,
weeks, months, years, decades, or centuries.
We discuss policies in terms of two major phases: preventing a conflict
from becoming intractable and transforming it so that it becomes more
tractable.
For preventing conflicts from becoming intractable, the analyses pre-
sented suggest several long-range strategies. One general strategy is to
avoid creating vested interests for continuing a conflict. This means, for
example, providing options for people who otherwise would be able to do
nothing except fight or wait for the total defeat of the adversary. These
matters are especially important with large-scale adversaries, such as eth-
nic groups and their organizations. This policy could be pursued by inter-
mediaries as well as the adversaries themselves.
Another important long-range policy is to avoid threatening the essen-
tial identity of the adversary. This is a policy that is especially pertinent for
the adversaries themselves. To prevent a conflict from becoming
intractable, each adversary should not deny the fundamental claims of the
other. Finally, developing institutionalized ways of handling a particular
kind of conflict reduces the likelihood that one of those kinds of conflicts
will become intractable. This includes making settlements that embody
procedures for dealing with the recurring disputes within the context of the
major conflict, which continues beyond particular settlements.
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In transforming intractable conflicts, one strategy is particularly relevant
for the rank-and-file members of the adversary groups if they plan to
develop support for accommodation with their opponent. This is a long-
range strategy in which support for accommodation when the time is pro-
pitious is gradually developed. Such efforts may take place in various
constituencies. For example, Schwartz (1989) describes the work of dia-
logue groups in the United States in which Americans from Jewish,
Palestinian, and other communities seek common ground and try to influ-
ence their communities and the U.S. government's policies toward an
accommodation between the Israeli government and the Palestinians.
Another policy is applicable for all segments of any adversary or for an
intermediary. That is to find some areas of possible settlement and work to
attain them. This presumes that an incremental approach to the transfor-
mation of an intractable conflict is possible and perhaps even necessary.
Among the long-term policies is one in which the past and hence the
current identifications are redefined. Interpreters (intellectuals and politi-
cians) play critical roles in these redefinitions. Intellectuals and politicians
are often ideological agitators, championing opposition to oppression, or
they are justifiers of the status quo. Less often, they are articulators of rec-
onciliation and accommodation between enemies. Yet, those latter roles
are, in the long run, critical.
In the short run, intermediaries and officials of adversary parties may try
to discover de-escalating strategies. This means selecting a set of parties
who might agree on even a partial settlement, excluding those who would
not agree, but not excluding those who could effectively prevent an agree-
ment. There are dilemmas here. Excluding intransigent parties in the dis-
pute may make it possible to reach an agreement, but the agreement may
not be implemented. Furthermore, excluding any parties with a stake in the
fight makes equitable treatment for them less likely. Strategies may involve
finding a set of contentious issues, perhaps even relatively peripheral ones,
about which an incremental agreement might be reached. The strategies
may also involve a blend of inducements that is sufficiently attractive to
make an agreement possible; the inducements would entail promised ben-
efits and the avoidance of particular harms.
Finally, intermediaries can contribute in various ways to transforming
intractable conflicts. For example, they can add compensatory benefits, or
otherwise increase the size of the pie, thereby reducing the zero-sum nature
of the conflict. This is illustrated by the U.S. government's role in the 1978
Camp David meetings between Israeli and Egyptian delegations headed by
Primary Minister Begin and President Sadat.
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Many actors can serve as intermediaries and perform mediating func-
tions. They may be nongovernmental as well as governmental persons and
groups, and they may be based in one of the adversary units or based in
social locations that are not aligned with any of the primary adversaries
regarding the particular issue in dispute.
We are well aware that we have not fully answered many of the ques-
tions we have posed. We hope that by posing them and providing partial
answers, others will help answer them more comprehensively. We believe
that there is much to be learned about how intractable conflicts gradually
or suddenly become tractable. Furthermore, reflecting on such transforma-
tions should give those persons who would want to de-escalate an intense
conflict an enhanced understanding about how such transformations can be
fostered. Comparing such diverse conflicts as we have provides a test of
such efforts. We believe that such comparisons can suggest insights about
each kind of conflict. What seems obvious and necessary about a conflict
can be recognized as a social convention that could be different under
changed circumstances.
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